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In France, a third of the population are overweight or obese,
2
 and there exist significant social 
disparities: 7.2% of children from higher socio-economic backgrounds are overweight and 
1.3% are obese, compared with 15.6% and 5.8% respectively of children from lower socio-
economic backgrounds. The economic and social costs of obesity are significant and have 
been estimated at EUR 20.4 million per annum, including both direct health costs and indirect 
costs, such as production losses connected to absenteeism.
3
 
 
To prevent obesity and related diseases, France has adopted a National Programme on Health 
and Nutrition (Programme national nutrition santé or PNNS). The first version of the PNNS 
took effect in 2001, and the fourth version is currently under discussion. To date this 
programme has tended to favour the adoption of incentive rather than legally binding 
measures. However, the Director of the PNNS himself, Professor Serge Hercberg, does not 
consider that incentive measures are sufficient to effectively prevent obesity. He has therefore 
called for a ‘new momentum’ in French nutrition policy. In a report for the Ministry of 
Health, which was published on 28 January 2014, he argued: 
 
‘Incentive measures have allowed some [policy] developments, but have shown their 
limits by only affecting a small number of the issues relating to food supplies. It is 
necessary to find other ways to speed up the improvement of the nutritional quality of 
the food supplied to consumers, and to make the physical and economic accessibility 
of healthier foods easier, especially for the most vulnerable populations.’4  
 
In line with the overall approach of the PNNS, which has arguably lacked ambition to date, 
France has not regulated the marketing of unhealthy food to protect children from its 
detrimental health effects in line with the WHO Recommendations. This policy choice must 
be assessed in its historical context. Two main instruments purport to regulate the marketing 
of unhealthy food to children. However, neither of them can be seen as amounting to an 
implementation of the WHO Recommendations (I). However, there are some signs that 
suggest that France might, in the not too distant future, finally implement the WHO 
Recommendations as part of its childhood obesity prevention strategy (II). 
 
I. A regulatory framework demonstrating very limited ambitions 
 
The French case study is characterised by the expression of highly polarised views reflecting 
the strong and often opposed interests at stake. The economic interests of the agrifood sector, 
the first economic sector in France, are very strong. As a result, attempts to provide a legal 
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framework restricting unhealthy food marketing have given rise to vocal opposition. This, in 
turn, has limited the opportunities for consumer organisations and learned societies of 
nutrition and public health experts to find sufficient support within government to restrict the 
marketing of unhealthy food, particularly to children. These antagonistic positions are 
reflected within government departments themselves. For example, despite the assertion of 
the existence of a National Food Policy in Article 230-2 of the French Rural Code, the 
measures aiming to tackle obesity and overweight nonetheless seem to originate from two 
main sources: some have been initiated and promoted by the Ministry of Health on the basis 
of the PNNS; whilst others have originated from the Ministry for Agriculture on the basis of 
the Programme National pour l’Alimentation (PNA, National Food Programme).5 These 
difficulties are compounded at a regional level, insofar as the concerted actions between the 
Offices of the Regional Departments for Food, Agriculture and the Forest (DRAAF, 
Directions Régionales de l’Alimentation, de l’Agriculture et de la Forêt), and the Regional 
Health Agencies (ARS, Agences Régionales de la Santé) have not been implemented 
evenly across the country. The lack of a coherent multisectorial government policy has 
hindered the implementation of an effective, evidence-based nutritional policy, and it is 
arguable that the failure of France to regulate unhealthy food marketing to children and 
implement the WHO Recommendations is both an illustration and the outcome of these 
tensions. 
 
The only legally binding measure adopted in France which relates specifically to the impact 
of food marketing on health is a requirement that food advertisers should insert health 
warnings in their advertisements (A). This measure is complemented by a self-regulatory 
initiative: a voluntary charter on nutrition and physical activity which commits private 
stakeholders, with the support of various Government ministries and public agencies, to 
improve the quality of food marketing broadcasted on French television and other audiovisual 
media services. This compromise was established between 2007 and 2009 after the failure of 
the proposal put forward by the Ministry of Health to ban unhealthy food advertising during 
television programmes aimed at children (B).  
 
A. The 2004 Public Health Act and the imposition of compulsory health 
warnings in food adverts 
 
Even though several legislative proposals have been made to this effect, France has not 
restricted the marketing of unhealthy food to children: instead, it has limited itself – with the 
adoption of the Public Health Act of 9 August 2004 – to mandate the insertion of health 
messages in all advertisements promoting processed food or non-alcoholic beverages with 
added sugar, salt or artificial sweeteners.
6
 
 
The parliamentary debates that led to the adoption of the Act illustrate existing tensions. 
During the first reading in Senate (the second chamber of the French Parliament), advertisers 
were offered an alternative: they could either decide to include a health message in their food 
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adverts broadcasted during children’s programmes, or if they decided not to broadcast this 
information themselves, they could instead finance a health message that would be 
broadcasted on the same channel and would last for the same amount of time. During the 
second reading in the National Assembly (the first chamber of the French Parliament), the 
text was modified, stating that ‘television advertising for food products whose composition 
may be harmful for children or teenagers if consumed in excess should finance the realization 
and broadcast of a nutritional information message’. The novelty resided in the introduction 
of the notion of nutrient profiles: the measure was intended to require the insertion of health 
messages in adverts promoting unhealthy food only. Finally, in the second reading in Senate, 
the advertisers were offered a choice: they could opt for the insertion of a health warning in 
their advert, or pay a contribution to the budget of the INPES (Institut National de Prévention 
et d’Education pour la Santé, the French National Institute for Health 
Education and Prevention) which will have to develop and broadcast appropriate health 
messages. This amounts to an implicit recognition of advertisers’ responsibility and can thus 
be compared to the application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle often used in environmental 
law and policy. However, the food industry has overwhelmingly opted in favour of inserting 
the health message, rather than the alternative solution of making a financial contribution to 
the health prevention budget of the INPES.  
 
The measure finally adopted, which the Governments supported, was codified in Article L 
2133-1 of the Public Health Code. However, it was strongly criticised by the members of 
parliament who were hoping for the introduction of unhealthy food marketing restrictions in 
youth-oriented television programmes.
7
  
 
Article L 2133-1 of the Public Health Code mandates that ‘commercial communications for 
drinks with added sugar, salt or sweeteners, or for processed food, must contain a health 
message. For commercial communications on the Internet, on television or on the radio, this 
obligation only applies to messages broadcasted from the French territory and received on this 
territory. The same obligation of information imposes itself to any promotion, aimed at the 
public, by print copies and publications edited by the producers or distributors of these 
products.’ The aim of this provision is to limit the influence of commercial advertising by 
reminding consumers of the importance of a healthy diet and physical activity for their 
health.
8
 
 
The 2004 Public Health Act was made operational with the adoption of delegated legislation 
laying down the specific requirements pertaining to the health messages and their use. Article 
L 2133-1 of the Public Health Code took effect as of 1
st
 March 2007.
9
 
 
The notion of ‘processed food’ has not been defined in law, but it is accepted that it should be 
interpreted broadly to cover all food which have undergone a process of transformation.
10
 The 
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provision does not apply to infant food, the marketing of which is prohibited except in printed 
publications specifically designed for health professionals.
11
 It does not apply to alcoholic 
beverages either which are subject to specific rules.
12
 
 
Four main health messages are listed: 
 
- ‘For your health, eat at least five portions of fruit and vegetables a day’13 
- ‘For your health, engage in regular physical activity’14 
- ‘For your health, avoid eating too much added fat, sugar or salt’15 
- ‘For your health, avoid snacking between meals’16  
 
However, these messages may vary slightly depending on the food, the media and the 
audience concerned. For example, they can be shortened on the radio; or they can be more 
informal if they are intended for a child audience (using ‘tu’ rather than the more formal 
‘vous’ form). 
 
Advertisers must ensure that the four main health messages rotate: they must use them all 
equally in each of their campaigns so that one message – for example the message relating to 
physical activity which may be seen as preferable from the point of view of food 
manufacturers – does not appear disproportionality to the detriment of the other three. 
Advertisers must also ensure that the health messages appear clearly and can easily be 
distinguished from the commercial message they accompany, and that they cover at least 7% 
of the advertising surface covered or – for radio advertising – they must be broadcasted 
immediately after the advert. 
 
The scope of application of Article L 2133-1 of the Public Health Code is relatively wide. It 
applies to television, cinema, radio, print and internet advertising, including both third-party 
websites and the websites of food business actors themselves. However, it does not extend to 
all forms of marketing. In particular, in the absence of advertising campaigns falling within 
the scope of Article L 2133-1, it does not apply to packaging, which means that consumers 
are not exposed to the message at point of sale. It also does not apply to brand advertising and 
sponsorship arrangements, even though such arrangements are popular with food advertisers 
which have been associated with major international and national sports events over the years 
(e.g. the Olympic Games, international and national football and rugby tournaments, the 
‘Tour de France’…).17 
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 Requiring that consumers be provided with specific information is a regulatory technique that 
has enjoyed considerable popularity in the development of EU and French consumer and 
health policies, not least because the ‘information paradigm’ places the onus on consumers to 
decide what is good for them and their families, expecting them to read the information and 
process it whilst taking their personal circumstances into account. Applying this rationale to 
food choices, the assumption is that if consumers are aware of the health risks involved in 
adopting unhealthy diets or in being physically inactive, they should be trusted to apply their 
knowledge and make appropriate choices.
18
 Such rationale, which assumes that consumers 
see, understand and act upon the information conveyed to them,
19
 differs from the rationale 
underpinning the imposition of marketing restrictions designed to protect children from the 
exposure to such marketing.  
 
B. The Nutrition and Physical Activity Charter: a very limited voluntary 
initiative  
 
In 2009, the food and advertising industries signed this Charter and undertook to facilitate the 
promotion of a healthy diet and physical activity in the programmes and advertisements 
broadcasted on television. In particular, they agreed: 
 
- to offer preferential rates for the broadcast of public health prevention campaigns; 
- to increase the space available for nutrition and physical activity education; 
- to develop short programmes promoting the objectives of the PNNS and referring to 
its ‘manger et bouger’ (‘eat and move’) website;20 and 
- more importantly for our purpose, to improve the ‘quality’ of the content of food 
adverts.  
 
The debates that led to the adoption of the Charter are also symptomatic of the profound 
divisions that exist both within and beyond government on how food marketing should be 
regulated in France. Following years of campaigning by l’UFC Que Choisir, France’s main 
consumer organization,
21
 then Secretary of State for Public Health and Sport, Roselyne 
Bachelot, announced on 4 February 2008 that she would lead discussions with a view to 
eliminating the marketing of unhealthy food aimed at children on French television.
22
 She 
indicated that she would start by promoting self-regulatory measures, and if the food and 
advertising industries failed to make meaningful commitments by May 2008, she would 
propose legislation. In the first instance, the food and advertising industries boycotted the 
discussions by adopting an ‘empty chair’ policy. However, the food industry became less 
antagonistic. This caused major concern for the French audiovisual industry which vigorously 
lobbied the Ministry for Culture and Communication, Christine Albanel, against the adoption 
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of a food marketing ban.
23
 The basis of their argument was the economic loss they would 
suffer if unhealthy food marketing was banned.
24
 The public and acrimonious clash between 
the Health Secretary of State and the Cultural and Communication Minister resulted in an 
unsatisfactory compromise: the adoption of the Charter,
25
 notwithstanding the clear support 
that health and nutrition learned societies had expressed in favour of more robust and 
meaningful regulatory restrictions.
26
 
 
The Charter’s primary objective is the promotion of a healthy diet and physical activity. To 
fulfil this objective, the Charter insists in particular on the necessity to ‘strengthen responsible 
food marketing practices’. The Charter therefore recognises that food marketing has an 
influence on food choices, and in particular children’s choices – as described in the earlier 
contribution in this Special Issue on the evidence base justifying the imposition of unhealthy 
food marketing restrictions. However, the commitments that the French food industry has 
been prepared to make to protect children from its harmful impact falls short of existing 
evidence. 
 
The Charter was subsequently revised in November 2013, and renewed for a five-year 
period.
27
 The 2009 version was originally signed by two government departments: the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Communications. Four have been added to the list: the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Overseas 
Territories (to reflect the fact that the scope of application of the Charter has been extended to 
these territories), and the Ministry of Sports and Youth. The Charter now applies to 36 
channels, as opposed to 19 in 2009, including digital terrestrial, overseas territories and local 
channels. The material scope of the Charter has also been broadened to cover not only linear 
television programmes but also Internet and on-demand television programmes, and the total 
volume devoted to the promotion of a healthy diet and physical activity has increased from 
between 340 and 470 hours to a minimum volume of between 587 and 753 hours. The revised 
Charter has also entrusted the CSA (Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel, the French Audio-
Visual Authority), which is one of its signatories, with the monitoring and the evaluation of 
the pledges it contains. 
 
However, as far as the marketing of unhealthy food to children is concerned, the Charter is 
neither binding nor innovative and clearly falls short of the WHO Recommendations. Firstly, 
the Charter rests on a voluntary approach which, as argued in another contribution in this 
Special Issue focusing specifically on conflicts of interest, is most unlikely to effectively 
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address the harmful impact of unhealthy food marketing on children. The Charter involves the 
industry as a health policy actor. In particular, it refers to the codes of conduct of the ARPP 
(Autorité de Régulation Professionnelle de la Publicité, the French Advertising Self-
Regulatory Association). In 2013, advertisers pledged to update, within six months, the code 
of conduct the ARPP had adopted in 2010 on Food Behaviour with a view to better 
delineating the general principles it laid down on: the need for a healthy diet, excessive 
consumption, snacking, nutritional comparisons, societal values relating specifically to food 
waste, diversity and physical activity, advertising involving children and/or directly targeting 
children.
28
 One cannot help but notice how general these rules are, and how little they add to 
what already existed.
29
 It is very clear that the pledges are not intended to reduce the exposure 
of children to unhealthy food marketing or the power that such marketing has on them. Even 
though signatories have pledged to promote healthy diets, the fact remains that in terms of 
concrete commitments, little meaningful progress has been achieved since the Charter was 
first signed in 2009. The renewed Charter insists on the fact that waste and unsustainable 
developments should be avoided. It also raises the question of the use of equity brand 
characters and licenced cartoon characters often accompanying the marketing of unhealthy 
food, for instance cartoon characters included in fast food children’s menus; but it does not 
propose to ban their use. However, the ARPP codes of conduct do not ban such techniques, 
even though research has established that, if associated with unhealthy food, they contribute 
to increased intake and preference of such food, as discussed in the chapter reviewing the 
relationship between unhealthy food marketing and childhood obesity. Rather, the ARPP’s 
Food Behaviour code of conduct requires that advertising using imaginary characters known 
by children and inciting them to eat a food should never promote food behaviour which would 
be contrary healthy food habits. In other words, licensed or equity brands characters can be 
used to promote unhealthy food, provided that such marketing does not condone excessive 
consumption – whatever the notion of ‘excessive consumption’ means in practice. In case the 
reader would have any doubt as to the leeway the ARPP Food Behaviour code grants 
advertisers, it adds: ‘The use in advertising of humour, the use of exaggerated statements, or 
the reference to fantasy worlds is allowed provided that it may not mislead children into 
believing that the consumption of the food in question could lead to certain achievements’.  
 
The contrast with the WHO Recommendations could not be starker, and we would argue that 
the Charter cannot, and should not, be seen as an implementation of the WHO 
Recommendations.  
 
Interestingly, the discussions surrounding the regulation of food marketing in France do not 
refer at all to the WHO Recommendations. Yet, as it is argued throughout this Special Issue, 
the WHO Recommendations should provide the yardstick against which national policies 
should be developed, implemented, monitored and evaluated.  
 
As discussed in the first contribution to this Special Issue, the objective of the WHO 
Recommendations is to alleviate the commercial pressure on children, in two ways that 
should be combined to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the national policies 
implementing them: 
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- Reducing children’s exposure to food marketing (how much advertising do children 
watch? Quantitative assessment): the broader the coverage of the rules, the more likely 
they are to protect children. They should not only cover television advertising, but 
other advertising in other traditional media (e.g. radio, print, billboards), advertising in 
digital media (not least the Internet, smartphones and tablets), and other forms , as 
well as other forms of marketing, beyond advertising to include sponsorship, product 
placement, advergames… . The scope of application of the Charter, even though it has 
been somewhat extended, remains particularly narrow, and only calls on advertisers to 
improve the quality of their unhealthy food advertising campaigns, without restricting 
their use, even in children’s programmes.  
 
- Reducing the power of particularly effective marketing techniques in all media (what 
are the techniques that are more likely to encourage children consumption of 
unhealthy food? Qualitative assessment): the aim is to restrict the use of these 
powerful techniques rather than make their use conditional on ensuring that they are 
not used to promote excessive consumption. 
 
One can only hope that scholarly societies, consumer associations, other civil society actors, 
and of course parliamentarians will be able to reclaim some control over the debate. 
 
The concerns are all the more acute as the limited pledges contained in the Charter are 
explicitly subject to the Government’s commitment that the legislative and regulatory 
framework relating to the marketing of unhealthy food to children will remain unchanged as 
of the day the Charter was signed and throughout its duration (until 2014 for the first version 
of the Charter, and until 2019 for the second one). In other words, the pledges would become 
obsolete in their entirety if the French Parliament legislated with a view to implementing the 
WHO Recommendations and thus decided to protect children from the negative impact that 
unhealthy food marketing has on their health. By promising to improve the quality of 
unhealthy food marketing to children – as opposed to suppressing it altogether – the French 
advertising and food industries have succeeded in obtaining guarantees that amendments to 
the existing regulatory framework would not be readily forthcoming.  
 
The question remains why the CSA (Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel, the French Audio-
Visual Authority) has consistently failed to support the effective implementation of the WHO 
Recommendations, even though the WHO Recommendations are based on robust evidence. It 
seems to have invoked two main arguments against the regulation of unhealthy food 
marketing in France. 
 
Firstly, the CSA has argued that a ban on the advertising of unhealthy food would have 
damaging effects on the French audio-visual sector, and could negatively affect the 
sustainability of many television networks. The basis for such an argument is unclear: unlike 
what happens in the United Kingdom, for instance, it is extremely difficult in France to have 
access to impact assessments. As a result, the lack of transparency is notorious, and the 
opportunities to have an informed public debate necessarily more limited. When Ofcom (the 
Office of Communications in the UK) banned the marketing of unhealthy food to children,
30
 
it relied on an impact assessment and a public consultation, as a basis for its decision,
31
 whose 
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 In March 2006 Ofcom proceeded to consult on a range of different options for new restrictions on television 
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in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ‘upheld as a primary 
consideration’. It is of course necessary to take economic issues into account in an overall 
assessment of existing policy options. Nevertheless, the sustainability of the French 
audiovisual model would arguably be protected by the fact that the marketing of other 
products could replace food marketing; or that healthy food could replace the marketing of 
unhealthy food. The introduction of unhealthy food marketing restrictions could provide an 
incentive for the industry to reformulate the food they offer so that they have a healthier 
nutrient profile and can in turn be promoted. At no point does the CSA mention existing 
studies which establish a direct relationship between unhealthy food marketing and childhood 
obesity. The fact that more and more United Nations institutions invoke the necessity to 
regulate food marketing to children, in order to protect their fundamental rights (in particular 
right to food and right to health), does not seem to be a concern for the CSA.
32
 
 
The second reason that the CSA has given to dismiss the prospect of adopting a marketing 
ban on unhealthy food to children rests on the fact that the examples of countries which have 
implemented such a ban would be ‘inconclusive’. The CSA has not identified any specific 
country, and it is therefore difficult to assess its sweeping claim. However, in a document 
originating from the CNA (Conseil National de l’Alimentation, the French National Food 
Council), one can find some indications of what the CSA may have had in mind. The fact 
remains that the references lack precision.
33
 A closer look at the CSA’s proposed ‘analysis’ 
raises concerns. Indeed, in order to dismiss these ‘inconclusive’ examples, the CSA invokes 
the multi-factorial nature of overweight and obesity (‘knowing that overweight and obesity 
have multifactorial causes’). It is clearly established that overweight and obesity are the 
outcome of the complex interaction of a wide range of factors (genetic, cultural, social, 
environmental…).34 No intervention alone can be sufficient to effectively solve this problem. 
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http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/204176/1/9789241510066_eng.pdf?ua=1. 
One should not conclude that countries suffering from high levels of childhood overweight 
and obesity have developed ineffective policies on the marketing of unhealthy food to 
children specifically. The CSA’s approach is deeply flawed, and it seems rather paradoxical 
that it would have reached this grossly over simplistic conclusion by asserting the complex 
nature of obesity.  
 
The Charter is not a fatality. The adoption of a more robust, evidence-based regulatory 
framework is still possible, despite the standstill clause inserted in the Charter to protect 
private sector operators from regulatory change. Recently, there have been encouraging signs 
suggesting that France may not be as categorically opposed to the regulation of television 
advertising as the discussions and reforms discussed above suggest. 
 
 
II. Towards some acknowledgement that France should regulate unhealthy food 
marketing to children? 
  
Despite these very slow developments and France’s failure to implement the WHO 
Recommendations, there are signs which suggest that the idea of regulating the marketing of 
unhealthy food to children is still alive in some circles. France has recently introduced a 
prohibition on commercial advertising in children’s programmes on public television channels 
which – even though it does not apply specifically to unhealthy food marketing – could play a 
role in protecting children from its harmful effects (A). Furthermore, there is an ongoing 
debate, with some voices strongly criticising the lack of sufficient consideration in France for 
the harmful impact on children’s health of unhealthy food marketing and its failure to pay due 
regard for its international commitments (B).  
 
A. Towards the regulation of television advertising to children?  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of meaningful progress on the implementation of the WHO 
Recommendations since 2009, André Gattolin MP submitted a legislative proposal in July 
2015 on the reduction of the exposure of children to television advertising for consideration 
by the French Parliament. This proposal was presented without government support and 
resulted in an alliance of convenience between the Green Party, sponsors of the draft, and the 
right-wing Republican Party. The Socialist government’s opposition to this proposal derived 
from the fact that the advertising ban was designed to apply exclusively to public television 
channels. It therefore feared the risk of revenue loss for France Télévisions
35
 and the 
consequences that such loss would have on the French animation industry. Indeed, France 
Télévisions is the main funder of animation programmes in Europe: it invests an average of 
EUR 30 million per year in the production of (often high quality and diverse) films and 
series.
36
 In 2015, the share of French production in the total supply of animation broadcasted 
on television was of 45%. Another argument which the Government put forward related to the 
voluntary commitment of France Télévisions not to broadcast advertising during television 
programmes for children aged between three and six years old, including programmes 
available on the Internet.
37
 However, at the second reading stage in Senate, the socialist 
members of Parliament had abandoned the idea of voting against the text and merely 
abstained. The Government had anticipated the adoption of André Gattolin’s legislative 
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proposal and signed an agreement with France Télévisions with a view to off-setting the cost 
of the foreseeable loss of advertising revenue of EUR 20 million for 2016-2020.  
 
Act 2016-1771 which was finally adopted on 20 December 2016 requires, in particular, that 
programmes from public television produced primarily for children under 12 years of age 
shall not contain commercial advertising messages.
38
 Health education and promotion 
messages do not fall within the scope of the prohibition, as they are not regarded as 
commercial advertising. The ban targets both television advertising and advertising in 
programmes available on the website of public channels. Furthermore, the Act also requires 
that the CSA shall submit a yearly report to the Parliament, which shall assess the 
commitments taken by the editors and advertisers to protect young children and teenagers and 
make recommendations to improve the self-regulatory commitments of the advertising 
industry. Bearing in mind that the CSA has not issued any report on the application of the 
Charter since 2012,
39
 the Parliament will therefore be in a position to monitor and evaluate the 
effectiveness of voluntary commitments – though the question remains whether it will 
actually and effectively do so.
40
  
 
Despite its limited scope, this text is significant in light of the fact that France had up to this 
point consistently refused to ban television advertising, even in children’s programmes. By 
legislating in this area, it allows for a partial implementation of the WHO Recommendations, 
in that the advertising ban it imposes applies to all goods and services, including unhealthy 
food.
41
 It is particularly noteworthy as it was adopted despite the vocal opposition of the 
ANIA (Association Nationale des Industries Alimentaires, the French Food Industry 
Association).
42
   
 
If that reform is a first step towards a limitation of the exposure of children to unhealthy food 
marketing, the fact remains that its impact is likely to be very limited. First of all, it only 
concerns television advertising (including on demand television) on public channels. How 
could we therefore speak of a ‘ring-fenced’ restriction whilst the restriction does not apply to 
private channels, irrespective of whether they are general or children’s channels? If we 
consider the ranking of channels in terms of audience share of children aged between 4 and 10 
years old, the first public channel is only in fifth position, the first four being private 
channels.
43
 In reality, public channels have less than 15% of audience share, which will 
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unavoidably and significantly lessen the impact of the new law.
44
 Furthermore, advertising 
investments made by advertisers on the websites of eight television channels aimed at 
children
45
 were estimated at EUR 3.4 million in 2012, representing 32% of all-sector 
investments on these channels’ websites, which shows the importance of on demand 
television as a medium for food marketing. Secondly, it is legitimate to ask whether it is 
efficient to regulate television without restricting all other media (internet, VoD, Youtube…) 
marketing unhealthy food, despite the fact that such media increasingly affect children. 
Thirdly, by only targeting programmes aimed at children under 12, the regulatory framework 
excludes family oriented programmes from the scope of the prohibition and does not 
effectively protect children, both under 12 and teenagers, from the harmful effects unhealthy 
food marketing has on them, notwithstanding the fact that an increasing number of actors 
have argued for more far-reaching restrictions. 
 
B. Ongoing voices arguing in favour of robust unhealthy food marketing 
restrictions 
 
Voices have begun to call for France to finally take into consideration the impact of food 
marketing on children’s eating behaviour, and to meet its international commitments.  
 
Firstly, in a report to the State Secretary for Health published in January 2014, Serge 
Hercberg argued for the regulation of unhealthy food marketing, emphasising the 
international consensus on the matter.
46
 In his report, Serge Hercberg suggests, among others, 
that France should regulate food marketing on the basis of the nutritional quality. As the 
objective is to reduce marketing pressures which encourage children (including teenagers), as 
particularly vulnerable consumers, to eat food of lesser nutritional quality, and to promote the 
consumption of healthier foods, he urges industry to reformulate its products. In stark contrast 
with the CSA, the report highlights that the experience of other countries which have 
regulated food marketing have been useful as part of national obesity prevention strategies. In 
particular, the arguments often raised to challenge the effects of unhealthy food marketing 
restrictions are discussed to demonstrate that the problem is not so much the regulation of 
such marketing, but rather the scope (which media…) and content of the restrictions thus 
adopted. In this context, Serge Hercberg recommends not to rely exclusively on self-
regulatory measures (such as the Charter) which are insufficient to reduce the impact of 
unhealthy food marketing.
47
 He suggests instead the imposition of a watershed on the 
marketing of all food with an unhealthy nutritional profile on television and the internet 
between 7am and 10 pm. He also recommends that advertising on radio and in print (posters, 
newspapers) should be accompanied by information on the food’s nutrient profile.48  
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The INPES also commissioned a report, completed in September 2014, which summarised the 
state of scientific evidence on the impact of marketing on children’s food preferences, 
purchase requests and eating behaviours and argued that France should implement the WHO 
Recommendations.
49
 This report showed in particular the existence of extensive literature 
written in English, and the paucity of research in French on the matter. This can probably be 
explained by the less noticeable presence in France of academic research on social marketing 
and, more generally, by the limited funding available for social sciences research on public 
health. The INPES itself carried out some research on how food was marketed to children 
(including teenagers), which looked at the media and the marketing techniques used, 
marketing investments, the food categories promoted, the impact on children’s food 
preferences and purchase requests, and  parents’ perception of regulating food marketing.50 
This report established that three quarters of food advertising investment (72%) in children’s 
programmes, representing EUR 29.7 million, were for unhealthy food.
51
 The study also 
showed that among the food advertising investments (including drinks and catering) on the 
websites of the eight children’s channels studied, ‘those for [unhealthy] food amounted to 
EUR 2.8 million in 2012, representing 82% of food investments in total by advertisers on the 
websites of these channels[…] The high pressure for fast food should be noted, with Mc 
Donald’s in the first position as advertiser for this type of products on children’s channels,  
with an investment of EUR 1.43 million.
52
 Facing this abundance of advertising for products 
with a lesser nutritional quality, the INPES sought the views of 934 parents of children aged 
between 4 and 17 on the possible introduction of restrictions or even a total ban on unhealthy 
food marketing. The results showed that 74% would support a law banning unhealthy food 
marketing to children.
53
 
 
Finally, and more recently, an interdisciplinary expert group undertook a collective study led 
by the INSERM (Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale, the French National 
Institute for Health and Medical Research), which assessed the decision of France to impose 
health message rather than restrict unhealthy food marketing, particularly to children.
54
 The 
study clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the health messages introduced in 2007 are 
ineffective. The expert group argued that, even though the messages are generally known by 
French consumers, they may nonetheless lead to a saturation effect. Furthermore, an 
exploratory study using eye trackers was carried out in parallel with the expert group study on 
a sample of 51 participants. It showed that the participants exposed to the health messages 
inserted in television food adverts paid hardly any attention to these messages.
55
 
Demonstrating the inefficiency of the mechanism set up by the 2004 Public Health Act, the 
expert group have recommenced to refocus the debate on the role that nutrition information 
can play in French nutrition policy, as well as its limits. The group argues that only a 
multisectoral policy, designed to improve the food environment, as opposed to a policy based 
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exclusively on the individual responsibility of consumers can effectively improve eating 
behaviours in the long term. In particular, they argue that the improvement of the health 
messages should not preclude France from adopting a legally binding framework banning the 
marketing of unhealthy food, particularly to children, in line with the international 
commitments that France has undertaken. They also emphasise the weaknesses of the self-
regulatory mechanisms intended to limit the impact of unhealthy food marketing (Charter 
from 2009), giving further weight to the similar recommendations contained in the Hercberg 
and INPES reports.  
 
 
Conclusion: 
A regulatory model relying far too heavily on the personal responsibility of consumers 
 
The nutrition policy which France has adopted shows that, despite the early implementation 
of the PNNS, the focus has tended to be placed on consumer information and education. If the 
objective of making individual consumers more responsible for their food choices and those 
of their families is necessary, it is not sufficient. It is also important to ensure that the food 
environment is durably changed. In particular, it is necessary to ensure that the positive 
outcomes of the French nutrition policy are more fairly distributed amongst individuals: it is 
only then that the strong health inequalities noted above can be reduced.
56
 In this regard, 
France’s lack of ambition is symptomatic of a timid policy which is characterised by its 
limited scope.  
 
The recent debate on the implementation of nutrition logos shows, however, that the 
implementation of a simplified system of nutrition labelling could empower consumers to 
make healthier food choices raises controversies. Only unbiased, non-misleading information 
available through the nutritional declaration mandated by Regulation 1169/2011 on the 
provision of food information to consumers has received the approval of the French food 
industry. However, using the possibility offered by Article 35 of the Food Information 
Regulation, France provided in its Act no. 2016-41 of 26 January 2016 on the modernisation 
of the health sector, the implementation of a simplified nutritional information in order to 
‘facilitate consumer choice in the light of the energy and nutrient content to their diet’.57 
However, a vivid debate arose regarding which system should be chosen to enable consumers 
to distinguish food on the basis of its nutritional profile.
58
 The Minister of Health therefore 
decided to nominate a Commission in February 2016 to experiment under real-world purchase 
conditions the four systems existing in France (Nutri-Score, SENS, Nutri-Repère and Nutri-
Couleurs). The Minister presented the Commission’s comparative study results on 15 March 
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2017 and announced that it would adopt a ministerial order implementing the ‘Nutri-Score’ 
logo. This interpretative system of information called ‘5C’ was recommended by the research 
team directed by Professor Serge Hercberg and has received the support of the French 
consumer organisation UFC Que Choisir, which urges food manufacturers and distributors to 
implement it.
59
 A letter and a colour are assigned to each food (on a scale from A, green, to E, 
red) depending on criteria based on food composition. This system is considered to be easily 
understandable, whilst relatively easy to implement.
60
 Even though the Secretary of State for 
Health has undertaken to implement this system, it could meet further opposition from 
business actors: the ANIA does not support its application, despite the results of the 
comparative study.
61
  
 
The point remains: if it is indeed important for France to support consumers in their food 
choices through simplified food information, the national obesity prevention strategy could 
not be complete without the implementation of the WHO Recommendations and the 
imposition of effective unhealthy food marketing restrictions. The 2009 Charter, renewed in 
2013, does not protect children from the harmful impact that unhealthy food marketing has on 
children. Evidence supporting a robust regulatory response is becoming ever more 
compelling, not only in English-speaking countries, but increasingly in France too. 
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